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I. Introduction
hile there is no single prevailing view of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, the credit markets are 
important in practically every mainstream view. The central 
bank is seen to influence the economy by affecting the pricing 
or the volume of credit instruments, or of financial assets more 
generally. At the same time, the credit markets are significantly 
influenced by securitization, particularly since a boom in 
mortgage securitizations took hold of the markets in the 1970s. 
The pace of that boom has since moderated, but the growth of 
securitization in other credit markets has been at least as 
vigorous in the past five years as it was in the mortgage markets 
two decades ago.
This paper investigates whether the cyclical effects of 
monetary policy have been influenced by the secular growth in 
securitization in recent decades. In particular, when the central 
bank makes a specific monetary policy move—such as 
increasing the overnight interbank rate by 50 basis points—is 
the ultimate effect on GDP different from what it would have 
been in the 1960s, when securitization was virtually 
nonexistent?
This question is considered from several angles. In 
Section II, we consider why, in principle, securitization may 
affect the results of a policy move. The analysis suggests that 
securitization has likely weakened the impact of any policy 
move. Alternatively, for policy to achieve a given intended 
result in terms of inflation or output, it may be necessary to 
make a larger policy move than was required earlier.
Section III describes the markets in which securitization has 
grown the most in recent years. The analysis suggests that the 
more prominently these markets feature in the monetary 
transmission mechanism, the more likely it is that they have 
contributed to a reduction in the efficacy of policy moves. We 
then construct in Section IV some simple empirical 
macroeconomic models with an explicit role for the level of 
securitization in the mortgage markets. These markets present 
the best opportunity to identify empirically the conjectured 
theoretical effects of securitization because they provide the 
longest-running time series of data in any securitized market. 
In the final section, we summarize the lessons derived from the 
various strands of the analysis.
II. Securitization and the 
Transmission Mechanism: 
Why Should Securitization 
Matter?
Casual reasoning suggests that if monetary policy operates 
through the credit markets, and if securitization has 
transformed the credit markets over the past few decades, 
securitization may have had important effects on the 
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transmission mechanism. In this section, we consider how 
those effects may have manifested themselves. In this 
discussion, we focus on two types of theories of the importance 
of these effects, which we classify as pertaining to the liquidity 
channel or the credit channel.
Liquidity channel theories emphasize the deepening of credit 
markets as a result of securitization, and draw conclusions 
about how the functioning of those markets may improve with 
this deepening and the associated additional liquidity. A classic 
paper in this literature is Black, Garbade, and Silber (1981). 
The authors present a model in which the “marketability” of 
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) 
securities increases as the GNMA market grows.1 This 
additional marketability influences the demand for both 
GNMA securities and directly held Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) mortgages, which are gross substitutes. 
The conclusion they highlight is that these changes tend to lead 
to lower interest rates in both the GNMA and the FHA markets.
More generally, however, this deepening and increased 
marketability suggest that the markets would be more efficient 
in the allocation of credit, and the additional liquidity would 
reduce undesirable distortions in these markets. Some of these 
distortions could be simple short-term fluctuations in pricing 
and credit availability owing to illiquidity. Beyond the short 
term, the additional liquidity would produce a market less 
susceptible to external forces such as the monetary policy 
operations of a central bank.
Kolari, Fraser, and Anari (1998) provide a recent review of 
the literature in this area. As is the case in most of this literature, 
the purpose of that paper is to show that mortgage interest rates 
have declined with the growth of securitization in the mortgage 
markets. This negative correlation between rates and the 
growth of securitization is almost always found in the empirical 
data.
Heuson, Passmore, and Sparks (2000) have a different take 
on this negative correlation. Their theoretical model is 
consistent with the earlier arguments under certain conditions, 
but under others the model has causality going in the reverse 
direction. Specifically, the paper shows that lower mortgage 
rates can lead to more securitization, rather than the other way 
around. Since both sets of conditions are plausible a priori, it is 
quite possible that causality runs both ways. 
Moreover, endogenizing the level of securitization makes 
the implications for the transmission mechanism more 
complex. On the one hand, market deepening owing to 
increased securitization could make it more difficult for the 
central bank to affect rates, as in the earlier models. On the 
other hand, if the central bank can still affect mortgage rates, it 
could produce fluctuations in liquidity whose potency could 
vary over the cycle. In a period of easing, securitization would 
tend to rise, making it more difficult for monetary policy to 
affect rates. In a period of tightening, the opposite would be 
true and policy would have more bite.
Several researchers have used cross-sectional empirical 
evidence to examine the pattern of securitization activity in 
periods of weakness. For instance, James (1988) and Stanton 
(1998) conclude that securitization by banks increases in 
periods of aggregate weakness or individual firm weakness. 
Minton, Opler, and Stanton (1999) reach a similar conclusion 
with regard to industrial firms. However, these cross-sectional 
patterns may not be obvious in the aggregate data. We shall see 
later that securitization of multi-family home mortgages, as a 
proportion of outstanding mortgages, tends to decline during 
recessions.
Katz (1997) provides a different view of the increased 
efficiency of the mortgage markets as a result of securitization. 
Her article argues that securitization has not only deepened, 
but also broadened the mortgage markets. Katz examines 
cross-sectional dispersion in mortgage rates in United States 
and finds that dispersion is negatively related to the extent of 
securitization. Thus, securitization has not only created deeper 
markets, but has contributed to the development of a single 
deep market.
Credit channel theories focus on the effects that monetary 
policy can have through changes in the demand for or the 
supply of credit, rather than through pure effects at the interest 
rate level. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identify a balance-sheet 
channel, based on cyclical fluctuations in the financial 
condition of borrowers, and a bank-lending channel, based on 
cyclical changes in the ability of banks to intermediate credit. 
We focus here on the latter, which has the more obvious and 
direct connection to securitization.
In the bank-lending-channel approach, banks specialize in 
the intermediation of credit by overcoming informational 
problems between lenders and borrowers in the credit markets. 
In a period of monetary tightening, these problems become 
more acute and it is more difficult for the bank to fund itself 
and, therefore, to provide loans. 
A key assumption of most of these models is that “banks 
cannot easily replace lost (retail) deposits with other sources of 
funds, such as certificates of deposit (CDs) or new equity 
issues.”2 Asset securitization can change this picture, since 
securitization provides an effective means for banks to deal 
with their funding problems. Although it is at times hard for 
banks to issue mortgages and hold them on their books because 
that requires continuous funding, banks could generate 
mortgages and securitize them immediately, obviating the need 
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implication is that the effect of a given monetary policy move 
may be more subdued in the presence of greater securitization. 
Securitization can also affect the volume of bank credit 
extended because of the need to standardize contracts and 
procedures. For instance, if lending criteria are tightened, the 
tightening is likely to be applied uniformly to all borrowers 
whose loans are intended for securitization. Thus, stricter 
criteria may affect a large population of borrowers and may 
thus have a larger aggregate supply effect.
Now that we have suggested that securitization can affect the 
transmission mechanism, the logical follow-up question is, 
does securitization matter in practice? Kuttner (2000) looks at 
this issue by comparing the relative growth of asset-backed 
securities and bank loans over the business cycle. He argues 
that if banks use securitization to buffer the effects of a 
monetary policy move, the volume of asset-backed securities 
and bank loans should move in opposite directions in response 
to monetary policy. He presents evidence that home mortgages 
since 1980 tend to show that type of behavior. In Section IV, we 
return to the empirical evidence on the direct question of 
securitization, after first reviewing the present extent of 
securitization.
III. The Growth and Reach 
of Securitization
The general idea behind a typical securitized issue is as follows. 
First, a bank originates credit market assets of some sort, for 
instance, home mortgages, credit card receivables, or boat 
loans. For various reasons, such as to reduce regulatory 
requirements on capital or improve liquidity, the bank may 
wish to take the assets off its books. However, it may still be 
interested in originating the asset, for reasons such as obtaining 
fee income or maintaining client relationships. The second step 
is to create a security by pooling together many similar assets 
whose aggregate income will provide the returns on the 
security. Finally, the security is sold to outside investors, in 
many cases institutional investors, and the corresponding 
assets and liabilities are taken off the bank’s books.
The phenomenon of securitization took hold initially in the 
home mortgage markets. By the late 1970s, a visible proportion 
of home mortgages was securitized, and the trend intensified in 
the 1980s. To this day, the proportion of home mortgages 
securitized continues to grow. At the end of second-quarter 
2000, 46 percent of all home mortgages were securitized. Since 
1980, we have seen substantial growth in new entrants to the 
securitization market, including more private sector 
participants, a greater variety of assets being securitized, and 
the extension of the trends internationally.
A catalyst for the development of mortgage securitization in 
the United States was the federal government’s sponsorship of 
a few financial agencies, namely, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and GNMA. These agencies 
issue securities whose income is derived from pools of home 
mortgages originated by banks and other financial 
intermediaries. In order to qualify for inclusion in these pools, 
mortgages must meet various requirements in terms of 
structure and amount. 
As of September 2000, these three agencies had outstanding 
mortgage-backed security (MBS) debt of $996 billion, 
$769 billion, and $575 billion, respectively, representing 
37 percent, 29 percent, and 22 percent of the market. Since the 
creation of these agencies, private sector issuers have entered 
the market, issuing securities that in many cases deviate from 
the conforming structure of the federally sponsored pools. 
Overall, residential mortgage-backed securities constitute 
30 percent of the securitized sector.
Many variants of the original MBSs have appeared over the 
years. Other types of loans may be used as the basis for the 
securities, such as multi-family home mortgages and 
commercial mortgages. Commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBSs) are frequently considered a different type of 
instrument altogether, because the risk characteristics and the 
degree of conformity are different from those associated with 
home mortgages.
Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) are a variation 
on the MBS approach that differs not in the nature of the 
underlying instrument, but in the temporal structure of 
expected payments. With a CMO, payments are divided into 
tranches, with the first one receiving the first set of payments 
that come in and later ones taking their turn in the receipt of 
payments. This structure makes the duration of the securities 
different and potentially easier to use for asset-liability 
management purposes.
The top two panels of Chart 1 show the growth of the MBS 
market from 1980 to September 2000; the bottom two panels 
provide similar information for the growth of CMOs from 
1987 to September 2000. Note that the growth of the MBS 
market has been fairly steady since 1980, whereas the CMO 
market grew dramatically from 1988 to 1992 and then leveled 
off.
The first two panels of Chart 2 offer another look at the 
growth of securitization of residential mortgages. The top 
panel shows the ratio of securitized mortgages to all mortgages 
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for components corresponding to single- and multi-family 
homes, respectively. The middle panel shows the same 
proportions for private sector mortgage-backed securities 
(sometimes called asset-backed securities, or ABSs). In both 
panels, the starting points are determined by data availability. 
The total ratio is dominated by single-family mortgages and 
exhibits a trend-like pattern. However, note that multi-family 
mortgages in the federally sponsored pools appear to be more 
cyclical, slowing down or declining in the 1981-82 and 1990-91 
recessions.
Another related instrument is securitized home equity 
loans. These are essentially based on second mortgages and 
thus have characteristics that are similar to the first-mortgage 
MBSs. Of course, the access to collateral on the home equity 
loans is of lower quality than that on first mortgages, and the 
risk characteristics of these securities are different.
Asset-backed securities is a term that applies to instruments 
based on a much broader array of assets than MBSs. This 
denomination may be applied to CMBSs and to securitized 
home equity loans, but it also includes other underlying 
instruments such as credit card receivables, auto loans, student 
loans, commercial bonds, commercial loans, and leasing 
receivables. Since 1996, securitization growth has increased yet 
further with the development of collateralized bond 
obligations and collateralized loan obligations, collectively 







00 98 96 94 92 90 88 86 84 82 1980
U.S. Outstanding Volume of Agency MBSs
1980-September 2000
Chart 1
Growth of the Mortgage-Backed Securities Market
Billions of Dollars
U.S. Issuance of Agency MBSs
1980-September 2000
Sources: Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA); Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA); Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (FHLMC).







































U.S. Outstanding Volume of Agency CMOs
1987-September 2000
GNMA
U.S. Issuance of Agency CMOs
1987-September 2000
FNMAFRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 5
To give a flavor for the growth of these ABS markets, the 
bottom panel of Chart 2 presents the securitization ratio for 
consumer credit since 1989 (earlier data are not available). 
Chart 3 shows the growth of various ABS markets since 1995; 
Chart 4 depicts the development of the CDO markets over the 
same period. 
At the short end of the maturity spectrum, commercial 
paper backed by corporate receivables had grown to more than 
$500 billion by the end of 1999. This figure represents about 
25 percent of the U.S. commercial paper market.
Mortgage- and asset-backed securities have also developed 
outside the United States. For instance, in the first half of 2000, 
MBS issuance in Europe was $18 billion, while ABS issuance 
accounted for another $11 billion. The CDO market is also 
active in Europe. Chart 2
Securitized Proportion of Mortgage 
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IV. Statistical Evidence of the 
Influence of Securitization
This section uses data corresponding to securitization in the 
U.S. mortgage markets to test the hypothesis that more 
securitization may reduce the efficacy of monetary policy to 
produce real economic effects. As noted earlier, this issue 
differs from those addressed in earlier research, which have 
focused on securitization’s effect on the level or the dispersion 
of mortgage interest rates. In essence, we turn our attention 
from constant terms in equations to “slope coefficients” that 
correspond to the average effect of policy on output or on 
interest rates.
A Simple Dynamic IS Curve
Our first model is an extension of an IS equation constructed 
by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). This equation models the 
effect of a change in the real interest rate on the output gap—
the proportional (or, more accurately, logarithmic) difference 
between real U.S. GDP and potential GDP as computed by the 
Congressional Budget Office. The Rudebush-Svensson
IS equation is:
(1)       ,
where   is the quarterly output gap,   is a four-quarter 
average of current and lagging federal funds rates,   is average 
inflation over the same four quarters, and   is a random 
disturbance term. Note that since an increase in the interest 
rate is contractionary, we expect that  .
To test for the effects of mortgage securitization on the 
reaction to monetary policy moves, we allow the coefficient of 
the real rate,  , and the intercept term,  , to vary with the 
extent of securitization. Securitization is represented by the 
ratio   of the value of securitized home mortgages to the value 
of all home mortgages, both obtained from the Federal 
Reserve’s Flow of Funds database. 
The time-profile of this ratio is different for single-family 
and multi-family home mortgages, as shown in the top panel of 
Chart 2. Both series have a strong upward-trend component. 
However, variations in the multi-family ratio have a much 
stronger business-cycle component. This ratio rises during 
expansions, but falls or slows down during the twin recessions 
in the early 1980s and the recession of 1990-91. For this reason, 
we examine the effects of the single- and multi-family ratios 
separately. The combined ratio is dominated by the much 
larger single-family figures, and thus its effects are very similar 
to those of the single-family ratio.







After we augment it with the securitization ratio, equation 1 
becomes 
(2)               
                          .
Table 1 presents the results for estimates of this equation, using 
data for single-family home mortgages from first-quarter 1966 
to second-quarter 2000. These results are consistent with the 
view that securitization has reduced the efficacy of monetary 
policy moves. The first column presents estimates for the base 
case equation 1, which is identical to that in Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999), except for the estimation period, which 
includes more recent data. The estimates are very similar to 
those of the earlier paper, and the negative sign of the interest 
elasticity is confirmed.
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Table 1
Estimates of IS Equation, Allowing Interest Elasticity 
to Vary Linearly with Securitization of Single-Family 
Home Mortgages
First-Quarter 1966 to Second-Quarter 2000 
                         

















0.13 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.12
(.223) (.703) (.356) (.158) (.263)
— 0.62 — -1.00 —
(.161) (.276)
1.20 1.19 1.17 1.16 1.17
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
-0.29 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
(.001) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
-0.06 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18
(.045) (.018) (.003) (.003) (.006)
— — 0.34 0.64 —
(.029) (.046)
— — — — 0.001
(.043)
0.912 0.913 0.915 0.916 0.914
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
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Columns 2-4 of Table 1 contain estimates of equation 2 in 
which only the intercept term, only the interest elasticity, or 
both terms are allowed to vary with the securitization variable. 
We see from the table that when only the intercept is allowed to 
vary, the additional parameter is not significantly different 
from zero.
When the elasticity is allowed to vary, its value tends to be 
negative but its absolute value generally varies inversely with 
the extent of securitization. Thus, with no securitization, the 
elasticity is -.14. With the current securitization ratio level of 
46 percent, however, the elasticity is estimated to be a small 
positive number, about .015. This value is not significantly 
different from zero but it seems to suggest that the direct 
policy effect of interest rates on output has virtually 
disappeared. 
In a way, this result is not inconsistent with much of the 
earlier literature, which has found it difficult to establish 
empirically a negative elasticity of output with respect to 
interest rates. In fact, the literature on the credit channel of 
monetary policy arose largely because estimates of this 
elasticity were too close to zero to be considered satisfactory in 
light of the prevalent theory (see Bernanke and Gertler [1995]).
A look at the almost monotonic rise of the level of 
securitization in Chart 1 suggests that it is almost like a time 
trend. Is it possible that the level of securitization in equation 2 
may be indistinguishable from a time trend, and thus a proxy 
for any variable highly correlated with a time trend?3 The last 
column of Table 1 reports the estimates for an equation that 
uses a time trend, instead of the level of securitization, in 
equation 2.4 
The trend variable is significant at the 5 percent level, so that 
the effect of securitization in the second column is similar to 
that of a time trend. However, there is some evidence that the 
securitization-based estimate dominates the result obtained 
with a simple trend. A straightforward test of the relative 
strength of the two models is Davidson and MacKinnon’s 
(1993, Section 11.3) J-test, which is applied to equation 2 with 
a constant intercept. The equation is first estimated with a 
trend in place of  , and the fitted values   are then included 
in an equation of the form
(3)    - .
If  , the model with the trend adds nothing to the 
estimate and the equation collapses to the one with the 
securitization ratio. If  , the equation reduces to the trend 
model. Thus, a statistical test of   can be helpful in selecting 
the preferred model. Using the data and sample period 
corresponding to Table 1, we see that the point estimate is
St y ˆt




-.21 with a standard error of 1.76. Clearly,   cannot be 
rejected, but the estimate is very imprecise.
The roles of the securitization ratio and the trend may be 
reversed in the J-test to ask whether the securitization ratio 
adds information beyond that contained in the trend. The 
point estimate in that case is  1.19, but the standard error is 
also high (1.69) and the hypothesis of   cannot be rejected. 
However, the point estimates are more consistent with a 
preference for the securitization model. A J-test in a nonlinear 
variant of the model, to which we now turn, seems to be more 
powerful and leads to a clearer statistical rejection of the trend 
model in favor of the securitization model.
One drawback of the varying-coefficient model discussed is 
that there is nothing to prevent the interest elasticity of output 
from being positive, which is counterintuitive and contrary to 
economic theory. Some theoretical discussions argue that the 
absolute size of the coefficient is small, but they stop short of 
suggesting that it would be positive. To deal with this issue, a 
nonlinear functional form may be used for the varying 
coefficient, which is then constrained to have the same sign 
throughout the sample period (although it is not constrained 
to be non-negative).
Table 2 contains estimates analogous to Table 1, but with a 
model of the form
(4)            
                       .
The sign of the interest elasticity is determined by  , whereas 
dependence on securitization and the trend are determined by 
 and  , respectively. The first column of Table 2 shows 
that the elasticity is negative, as expected, and that its absolute 
value decreases with securitization. The latter result, however, 
is significant only at the 10 percent level. 
The estimates from the first column of Table 2 indicate that 
the interest elasticity has fluctuated from -.21 with no 
securitization, to -.013 with the current securitization ratio of 
.46. Chart 5 shows the range of values of this elasticity since 
1966, together with 95 percent confidence bands.5 The chart 
indicates that, even though the magnitude of the elasticity is 
currently fairly small, the estimate is statistically different from 
zero. The statistical significance of the negative sign of the 
elasticity is confirmed by the estimate of  , which determines 
the sign and has a p-value of .025. 
The model with the trend (the last column of Table 2) 
performs worse compared with the securitization model. First, 
the effect of the trend is insignificant, even at the 10 percent 
level. Second, a J-type test rejects the trend model strongly in 
favor of the securitization model. Because of the nonlinear 
α = α 0 =
α =
α 0 =
yt β00 β01St β1yt 1 – β2yt 2 – ++ + =
β30 β31St β32t + () exp it 1 – πt 1 – – () ηt ++
β30
β31 β32
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form of this model, the parameter in the J-test may be 
estimated simultaneously with the competing parameters in an 
equation of the form
(5)
          .
In this equation, the point estimate is  -5.6e-14 with a 
standard error of 2.5e-12 and a t-statistic of -.02, which has a 
p-value of .982.
Single-family home mortgages constitute the largest piece of 
the MBS business. However, securitization of multi-family 
homes is also quite extensive. In Tables 3 and 4, we perform an 
exercise similar to the one in Table 2, but using the ratio of 
securitized multi-family mortgages to all multi-family 
mortgages. As in Table 2, the nonlinear form of the interest 
elasticity is used. The results in Table 3 suggest that the level of 
the securitization ratio for multi-family mortgages does not 
yt β0 β1yt 1 – β2yt 2 – ++ =
β30 1 α – () β31St () αβ32t () exp + exp [] it 1 – πt 1 – – () ηt + +
α =
Table 2
Estimates of IS Equation, Allowing Interest Elasticity 
to Vary Nonlinearly with Securitization 
of Single-Family Home Mortgages
First-Quarter 1966 to Second-Quarter 2000
                         







  0.14 0.18 0.16
(.135) (.208) (.124)
—- 0 . 1 8 —
(.715)
  1.16 1.16 1.18
(.000) (.000) (.000)
  -0.23 -0.23 -0.26
(.007) (.008) (.003)
  -0.21 -0.23 -0.22
(.025) (.054) (.139)
  -6.02 -6.62 —
(.096) (.123)
  —— - 0 . 0 1
(.166)
  0.915 0.915 0.914
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
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Table 3
Estimates of IS Equation, Allowing Interest Elasticity 
to Vary with Securitization of Multi-Family Home 
Mortgages
First-Quarter 1966 to Second-Quarter 2000
                         













  -0.27 -0.26 -0.26
(.001) (.002) (.002)
  -0.08 -0.15 -0.15
(.018) (.050) (.012)
  — -21.21 -23.54
(.278) (.175)
  0.913 0.914 0.914
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
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have a significant effect on the interest elasticity, although the 
estimated signs are consistent with those obtained with the 
single-family ratio. 
The estimates in Tables 1-3 assume that the securitization 
ratios are exogenous, which raises an econometric issue. The 
Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) IS equation is constructed in such 
a way that the regressors are all predetermined, but the 
securitization ratio enters contemporaneously. The results of 
specification tests suggest that endogeneity is not a problem for 
any of the ratios. For instance, we apply an omitted-variables 
version of the Hausman test to equation 2, with a constant 
intercept, using a time trend as an instrument for  . The 
residual from a regression of   on the trend and the other 
predetermined variables is included in equation 2 and is tested 
for significance.6 Its p-value is .700, even though the 
instrumental-variables estimate of the   coefficient is 
significant at the .042 level. Similarly, a Hansen (1982) test of 
the overidentifying restriction imposed by using the time trend 
as an instrument produces a p-value of .703.7
Hausman and Hansen tests also fail to reject the exogeneity 
of the securitization ratios based on multi-family and private 
sector securities. When the change in the proportion of multi-
family housing is used, the p-values of the two tests are .166 and 
.174, even though the variable exhibits some cyclical properties. 
Private sector securities are bound to be less insulated from 
cyclical fluctuations than federally sponsored agency securities. 
However, when the securitization ratio is based on the level of 
private sector mortgage-backed securities, the p-values of the 
tests are .539 and .573, respectively. Thus, the exogeneity 
assumptions employed in estimation seem reasonable.
The foregoing analysis has focused on aggregate economic 
activity, as represented by the output gap, because monetary 
policy tends to focus on aggregates, rather than on individual 
sectors. However, if there is evidence that home mortgage 
securitization has affected the efficacy of monetary policy, it 
seems likely that the changes would be most noticeable in the 
housing sector. Thus, we conclude this section by estimating a 
model analogous to the IS equation, but focusing on housing 
investment. Although in principle a model of housing 
investment might include variables not included in the 
IS curve, we retain the form of the latter and view housing 
investment as an interest-sensitive component of aggregate 
output.
The housing investment model has the same form as 
equation 4:
(6)              




ht β00 β01St β1ht 1 – β2ht 2 – ++ + =
β30 β31St () it 1 – πt 1 – – () ηt + exp +
where   is the detrended log-level of housing investment, 
using a linear trend from first-quarter 1965 to second-quarter 
2000. The results appear in Table 4. The point estimates of the 
elasticity are larger than they are in the aggregate output 
equation, confirming that housing investment is more sensitive 
than output to changes in the real interest rate (Chart 6). In 
addition, both   and   are much more significant than they 
are in the output equations.
As a final note, the results of this section are based on ratios 
of mortgages securitized by federally sponsored pools to all 
mortgages. In principle, pools issued by private sector firms 
have different risk characteristics that could have other 
implications for the analysis. For instance, the path of the 
interest elasticities could be different, or the ratios might be 
endogenous. Empirically, however, results based on private 
sector pools are qualitatively identical to those obtained with 
data from federally sponsored pools. In particular, the time 
patterns of the elasticities are the same and the exogeneity of 
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Interest Elasticity to Vary with Securitization 
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1.25 0.81 1.56 2.17
(.087) (.303) (.019) (.024)
— 4.22 — -2.78
(.137) (.387)
1.54 1.52 1.48 1.47
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
-0.67 -0.66 -0.64 -0.63
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
-0.48 -0.64 -1.72 -2.05
(.030) (.009) (.002) (.005)
— — -5.05 -6.14
(.011) (.012)
0.938 0.939 0.941 0.942
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
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Policy Influence on Mortgage Rates
The results in the preceding subsection suggest that the interest 
elasticity of aggregate demand has declined with the rise of 
securitization. We now ask if this decline took place because the 
effect of monetary policy on the level of mortgage interest rates 
has declined as well. We address this question by constructing 
an empirical model of the relationship between the federal 
funds rate—a direct instrument of monetary policy—and 
a mortgage interest rate. 
The model is derived from a structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model involving the mortgage rate, 
other interest rates, and variables representing real activity and 
inflation.8 Let   represent a vector containing the variables in 
the SVAR, namely, commodity price inflation, consumer price 
inflation, the output gap, the federal funds rate, the three-
month Treasury rate, the ten-year Treasury rate, and the 
mortgage rate. The first step is to estimate a VAR of the form
(7)                                     ,
where, as usual, L is the lag operator and A contains only non-
negative powers of L. Tests of successive lags suggest that   
represents the data well with two lags.
Let ,  where  C is a lower triangular matrix 
representing the Choleski decomposition of  , with the 
variables ordered as they were listed above. Then
(8)                                    
is a triangular structural model of the innovations in each of the 
included variables. In particular, the last row of equation 8 is a 
structural representation of the relationship of the mortgage 
rate to the other variables, which may be expressed in the form
Xt
AL () Xt ηt =
AL ()
Ω V ηt () CC' = =
Ω
C
1 – ηt εt =
(9)    .
By analogy to the analysis of the IS equation earlier, the 
principal question is whether the coefficient of the federal 
funds rate innovation,  , has been affected by the extent of 
securitization.
A simple way to obtain the coefficients of equation 9 using 
ordinary least squares is to run an equation of the form
(10)                
                                  ,
where the ellipsis represents two additional lags of each of the 
included variables, including the mortgage rate. The variable 
 is the yield on FHA-insured mortgages (secondary-market), 
 is the three-month Treasury bill rate,   is the ten-year 
Treasury bond rate, and   is the federal funds rate. We use a 
secondary-market mortgage yield rather than a contractual 
mortgage rate because reported values of the contractual rates 
are slow to reflect new information. The estimates of the   
coefficients in equations 9 and 10 are identical. 
To allow the constant term and the influence of the federal 
funds rate to vary with the level of securitization, we expand 
equation 10 to become
(11)   
                   .
As before, the equation includes two lags of all variables, 
including the terms involving  . Estimates of equation 11 are 
presented in Table 5. The first column constrains the terms in 
to be zero, whereas the next two columns allow the constant 
and slope terms to be nonzero, respectively. 
The results indicate that the most important marginal 
relationship of the mortgage rate is to the ten-year Treasury 
rate, as might be expected because of the similar maturities of 
these two rates. The federal funds rate and the level of 
consumer inflation are also significant. The level of 
securitization does not significantly affect the constant term, 
but there is evidence that it does affect the influence of the 
federal funds rate on the mortgage rate. The effect is relatively 
large and is significant at the 5 percent level. For instance, in the 
third column, a one-percentage-point move in the federal 
funds rate increases the mortgage rate by 15 basis points when 
there is no securitization. However, when the securitization 
ratio is at its current level of 46 percent, the same change in the 
federal funds rate implies an increase of 40 basis points in the 
mortgage rate.
These results stand in sharp contrast to the results obtained 
for the IS equation earlier. Why would the federal funds rate, 
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activity, become more influential on mortgage rates? One 
possible answer is that the growth of securitization, coupled 
with deregulation and other financial innovations, has made 
the mortgage markets more efficient in the informational 
sense. A change in basic credit pricing, represented by a change 
in the federal funds rate, translates more quickly and fully into 
a change in mortgage rates. This argument is supported by 
results in Hendershott and Van Order (1989), who show that 
the mortgage rate has become more representative of a “perfect 
market” rate.
The combined results of Section IV suggest that although 
the influence of monetary policy on the real economy seems to 
have declined with securitization, the decline does not seem to 
be associated with a direct pricing effect through mortgage 
interest rates. In fact, the results in this subsection suggest that 
the effects of changes in the federal funds rate are transmitted 
more directly to the mortgage rate in the presence of higher 
levels of securitization. Thus, the decline in the influence of 
policy is more likely to be related to its influence on the volume 
of liquidity or on the supply of credit (the liquidity and credit 
channels, as discussed earlier), rather than to direct interest rate 
effects.
V. Conclusion
The empirical analysis of this paper indicates that 
securitization may have had a significant effect on the degree to 
which a given change in monetary policy can influence real 
output. In fact, the interest elasticity of output as calculated in 
one of the models is currently very close to zero. However, the 
reaction of mortgage rates to changes in the federal funds rate 
is, if anything, stronger with the increasing extent of 
securitization. Thus, the change in the efficacy of policy seems 
to derive not from a loss of control over mortgage rates, but 
from noninterest rate effects, such as the liquidity and credit 
channels.
These results stress the importance of research on these 
channels of monetary policy for at least two reasons. First, the 
results suggest that an important part of the transmission of 
policy through the mortgage markets occurs via liquidity and 
credit volumes, as opposed to interest rate effects. Second, if the 
measurable effects of policy on output, as proxied here by the 
simple IS curve, are currently close to zero, it is important to 
understand alternative explanations of policy that do not rely 
exclusively on the effects of changing interest rates.
We have also seen evidence that the development of new 
forms of securitization is still booming in many sectors and 
countries. The question is, to what extent will these new types 
of securitization affect the transmission of monetary policy, as 
mortgage securitization seems to have done? Perhaps the key is 
to ask whether the new forms of securitization will provide 
banks with additional flexibility to face changes in market 
conditions associated with monetary policy. Monetary policy 
acts most directly through the banking system, and changes in 
the structure of that system are likely to affect policy as well. 
Thus, the effects of securitization seen in the mortgage markets 
may be expected to extend to other markets as well, as new 
forms of securitization allow banks to take assets off their 
balance sheets, provide banks with greater funding flexibility, 
and open a door to investors to markets traditionally 
intermediated by banks.
Table 5
Estimates of Mortgage Rate Equation, Allowing 
Elasticity with Respect to the Federal Funds Rate 
to Vary with Securitization of Single-Family Home 
Mortgages
First-Quarter 1966 to Second-Quarter 2000
                 












  — -0.68 — -5.30
(.919) (.480)
  -2.10 -2.19 -2.50 -2.66
(.458) (.451) (.376) (.353)
  -19.14 -20.01 -20.68 -18.95
(.032) (.034) (.024) (.041)
  -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.003
(.918) (.857) (.839) (.929)
  0.19 0.19 0.15 0.13
(.002) (.002) (.019) (.047)
  — — 0.54 0.63
(.051) (.048)
  -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10
(.160) (.183) (.150) (.184)
  0.91 0.91 0.90 0.88
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
  0.991 0.991 0.992 0.992
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. The ellipsis in the equation represents 
two lags each of all the variables, including the mortgage rate. 
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1. Mortgage pass-through securities issued by GNMA are discussed in 
Section III.
2. Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
3. One potential problem is that y may not be stationary. However, a 
Dickey-Fullter t-test (with two lags) rejects a unit root with a p-value 
of .02.
4. Hirtle and Kelleher (1990) also use a time trend to examine 
variations in the interest sensitivity of output.
5. The confidence bands are asymmetrical, since they are computed 
using a nonlinear technique, rather than the standard delta method. 
The coefficients of the nonlinear elasticity function are assumed to be 
jointly normally distributed, and the extrema of the function over a 
95 percent confidence ellipse are plotted.
6. See Godfrey (1988, p. 194). Intuitively, if   is not exogenous, it is 
generally correlated with the disturbance in equation 2. The 
additional term, based on the residual from the first-stage regression 
of   on the exogenous variables, represents the component of the 
disturbance that is correlated with  , which should therefore be 
significant.
7. The Hansen test determines whether redundant orthogonality 
conditions can be rejected. In this application, both   and the trend 
are included as instruments. Since the trend is clearly exogenous, if the 
test were to reject the joint exogeneity of   and the trend, it would 
have to be because   is not orthogonal to the disturbance.
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